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Big Little Lies: How Loopholes in the
Small Business Act Allow Large
Businesses to Profit
Halley Townsend*
Abstract
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was established
by Congress to create and administer programs to help small
businesses compete in the national economy. But far too often,
large, sophisticated firms profit from SBA programs meant to
assist the little guy. Currently, Congress legislates specific
programs tailored towards one type of small business, and the
SBA is responsible for implementing the program. This process
has resulted in loopholes in the SBA’s enabling act that permit
powerful businesses to qualify for SBA programs. This result is
the opposite of what Congress intended.
Part II provides background and the history of the SBA.
Part III then discusses four SBA programs in detail: the 8(a)
Business Development Program for minority owned small
businesses, the Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business
Program, the 7(a) Business Loan Program, and the 7(b) Disaster
Loan Program. Part IV exposes the loopholes in these four
programs that, at best, enable large entities to profit and, at
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as my Note advisor. Thank you also to the members of the Washington and
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worst, facilitate outright fraud. Finally, to ensure that federal
assistance programs intended for smaller businesses do not
instead benefit larger entities, Part V proposes that Congress
amend the Small Business Act to create a broad, enabling
superstructure under which the SBA could both create and
implement its own programs to assist small businesses.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Chenega Corporation describes itself as “the most
successful Alaska Native village corporation.”1 Established in
1974, after the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act granted
the Chenega people 70,000 acres of land,2 Chenega now operates
almost exclusively through its thirty subsidiaries.3 These
subsidiary entities enable Chenega to perpetually compete for
high-value contracts exclusive to the Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) program for minority-owned small
1. Capabilities, CHENEGA, https://perma.cc/VS2V-TJQV.
2. About, CHENEGA, https://perma.cc/9UNA-H328.
3. See Chenega Corporation Company Hierarchy, BLOOMBERG L.,
https://perma.cc/K28G-2JGV (PDF) (documenting Chenega’s subsidiaries and
related entities) (last updated Jan. 27, 2022).
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businesses—access to these contracts is only meant to last for
nine years.4 From 2000 to 2009, the federal government
awarded Chenega federal prime contracts totaling more than
$1.9 billion.5 In 2020, Chenega’s gross revenue was $949
million.6
In 2012, the federal government awarded over $500 million
in contracts to Strong Castle LLC, an SBA-designated
service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB).7 The
owner of Strong Castle, Braulio Castillo, had obtained SDVOSB
status based on a minor foot injury he suffered while playing
sports at a military preparatory school.8 After nine months of
prep school, he played quarterback for the University of San
Diego’s football team—despite the foot injury on which his
SDVOSB status later hinged—and went on to found Strong
Castle.9 The General Services Administration, rather than the

4. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2022) (“[A] Participant receives a program term
of nine years from the date of SBA’s approval letter certifying the concern’s
admission to the program.”).
5. STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., REP. ON NEW
INFORMATION ABOUT CONTRACTING PREFERENCES FOR ALASKAN NATIVE
CORPORATIONS (PART II) 16 (2009), https://perma.cc/UB7R-G7UY (PDF).
6. Alaska’s Top Locally-Owned Companies Ranked by Gross Revenue,
ALASKA BUS. MAG. (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/NP6K-3CZ9 (click on
thumbnail number 5). Also note that of Chenega’s 6,505 employees, only 188
are listed as being “in Alaska.” Id.
7. See John P. Fletcher, Note, Recognizing Sacrifice: Prioritizing
Contract Awards Within the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business
Program and the Veterans First Contracting Program, 45 PUB. CONT. L.J. 143,
144 (2015) (describing Castillo’s story). Castillo founded Strong Castle LLC as
a holding company; the company was ultimately operating as Strong Castle
Inc. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., REP.
ON QUESTIONABLE ACQUISITIONS: PROBLEMATIC IT CONTRACTING AT THE IRS 16
(2013) (PDF), https://perma.cc/ZS82-XEWW.
8. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 144; see STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
& GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE ACQUISITIONS:
PROBLEMATIC IT CONTRACTING AT THE IRS 16–25 (2013) (PDF),
https://perma.cc/ZS82-XEWW (giving background on Strong Castle and
detailing how he exaggerated his injury and military service).
9. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 144; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE ACQUISITIONS:
PROBLEMATIC IT CONTRACTING AT THE IRS 16–25 (2013) (PDF),
https://perma.cc/ZS82-XEWW.
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SBA, later debarred Strong Castle.10 Two years later he was
convicted for murdering his wife and business partner, Michelle
Castillo.11
In 2020, Martin Defense Group LLC obtained more than
$12.8 million in SBA Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loans.12 The CEO, Martin Kao, lied on his application regarding
the number of workers he employed and the fact that he had
already received a PPP loan.13 The SBA also sent money to
“self-described farmers operating in densely populated cities”
via its Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program.14 The
SBA approved over $150,000 for a poultry farm whose registered
address was an upscale apartment in Greenwich Village,
Manhattan.15
The actions of some of the characters in these stories are
explicitly allowed by law, while others are blatantly fraudulent,
but there is one common theme: each individual and firm
described above used an SBA program to turn a profit. Listed
here are just a few instances of countless more examples of

10. Although it requires creating a free System for Award Management
(SAM) account, once you create your account you can find this fact by
navigating to “search,” “entity information,” then “all entity information.”
Under “filter by,” open the “entity status” drop down and check the box next
to “inactive.” Open the “entity name” drop down, then under “DUNS” enter
052821050 to search. Select the result “Strong Castle, Inc” and click
“exclusions” on the sidebar. You can see that the registration is expired, which
is why the exclusions are listed under “inactive.” General Services
Administration is listed as the excluding agency. Strong Castle, Inc., SYSTEM
FOR AWARD MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/345U-J546.
11. See Castillo v. Commonwealth, 827 S.E.2d 790, 797 (Va. Ct. App.
2019) (containing Castillo’s conviction); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE ACQUISITIONS:
PROBLEMATIC IT CONTRACTING AT THE IRS 16 (2013) (PDF),
https://perma.cc/ZS82-XEWW (stating that Braulio and Michelle Castillo
founded Strong Castle in 2011).
12. David McAfee, Hawaii CEO Charged With $12.8 Million Covid Relief
Fraud Scheme, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 1, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://perma.cc/M7YNJA4Q.
13. Id.
14. Zachary Mider et al., Poultry Farms in Apartment 13D Show Scale of
Pandemic-Aid Fraud, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 24, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/K2SW-AATZ.
15. Id.
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sophisticated entities benefitting from SBA programs.16 This
Note explains why this happens so often, and points towards a
solution that would realign SBA programs with congressional
intent for the agency.
The SBA is a federal agency that was established by the
Small Business Act17 to assist the concerns of small
businesses.18 The SBA maintains several contracting assistance
programs, including the 8(a) program for businesses owned by
economically and socially disadvantaged individuals19 and the
SDVOSB program for service-disabled veteran-owned
businesses.20 The SBA also provides business loans to small
businesses that are unable to obtain funding from traditional
sources through its 7(a) program,21 as well as loans to small
businesses after a declared disaster via its 7(b) program.22 The
head of the SBA is called the Administrator and is not only
appointed by the President but is a member of the Cabinet.23

16. See, e.g., Michelle Davis et al., An Avalanche of Fraud Buried a
Small-Business Relief Program, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 29, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/3YRB-DWCF (describing how an SBA program meant for
small businesses gave out $10,000 to anyone who filled out a five-minute
online application); ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46322, SBA
WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS FEDERAL CONTRACTING PROGRAM 18 (2021)
(discussing the high number of ineligible businesses found in the SBA’s
women-owned small business program during annual reviews); U.S. SMALL
BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 18
(2018), https://perma.cc/ZC7S-Y6JY (PDF) (discussing a large construction
corporation’s exploitation of SBA HUBZone and 8(a) programs, resulting in a
$1.5 million settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Department of
Justice).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 608 et seq.
18. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1) (“It is the declared
policy of the Congress that . . . the Small Business Administration . . . should
aid and assist small businesses . . . .”).
19. See id. § 637 (authorizing the 8(a) program).
20. See id. § 657b (authorizing the SDVOSB program).
21. See id. § 636(a) (authorizing the Business Loan Program, also known
as the 7(a) program).
22. See id. § 636(b) (authorizing the Disaster Loan Program, also known
as the 7(b) program).
23. See 13 C.F.R. § 101.101 (2022) (“An Administrator, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, manages SBA.”); About
SBA, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., https://perma.cc/KH75-RW46 (SBA is the only
cabinet-level federal agency fully dedicated to small business . . . .”).
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This Note argues that the structure through which
Congress and the SBA create and administer SBA programs is
broken. Congress quickly creates one-off small business
assistance programs, and then turns to the SBA to actually
implement the program.24 This process results in foreseeable
and repeated instances of fraud and the creation of statutory
loopholes.25 This Note argues that many of these undesirable
outcomes would resolve if Congress amended the Small
Business Act to create a broad, enabling superstructure under
which the SBA could both create and implement its own
programs to assist small businesses.26
Part II provides background on the history of the SBA to
illustrate how the SBA evolved into what it is today. Part III
introduces the four SBA programs on which the Note will focus
in greater detail. Part IV points to how these four programs
contain loopholes allowing large entities to profit and are
vehicles for outright fraud. Finally, Part V proposes that
Congress and the SBA could interrupt this cycle if Congress
amended the Small Business Act to create a broad, enabling
superstructure under which the SBA could create and
administer its own programs. These changes would ensure that
high dollar federal assistance programs intended for small
businesses do not benefit larger businesses instead.
II.

HISTORY OF THE SBA

The SBA did not officially exist until 1953 when President
Eisenhower signed the Small Business Act into law.27 The
storyline of the SBA, however, began when Congress created the

24. See, e.g., Kate Rogers et al., As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main
Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2021, 1:00
PM), https://perma.cc/UGL4-QS5E (describing how “the U.S. government and
SBA rushed to get loans out the door” in response to the pandemic); Press
Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Announces Opening of Paycheck
Protection Program Direct Forgiveness Portal (Jul. 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/J76C-S2AT (noting how a new portal “will help rush relief to”
small businesses).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 204(a), 67 Stat.
230, 233 (July 30, 1953) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 608–609) (creating the Small
Business Administration).
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War Finance Corporation during World War I and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) during the Great
Depression to give loans to banks, railroads, and businesses.28
Contract manipulation, in which the government attaches
conditions to contract awards, became widespread during the
1930s or shortly after.29 During World War II, Congress became
concerned with large industries obtaining most of the defense
contracts, and as a result created the Smaller War Plants
Corporation (SWPC) agency in 1942.30 The SWPC issued both
direct loans and encouraged banks to give credit to small
businesses.31 The agency also advocated on behalf of small
businesses, encouraging other agencies and larger businesses to
contract with smaller firms.32 The SWPC only lasted for four
years33 until Congress took away its lending authority as a
result of public pressure to stop spending taxpayer money to
fund an agency that lacked expertise.34 Five years later, the
Korean War broke out and Congress created the Small Defense
Plants Administration (SDPA), giving it similar powers to those
held by the SWPC.35
28. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of
Congress, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14 (2011).
29. See Arthur Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27, 28–29 (1955) (“[Contract manipulation]
can enforce a prescribed standard, or prohibit certain activities, or favor one
segment of society.”); see also Andrew George Sakallaris, Note, Questioning
the Sacred Cow: Reexamining the Justifications for Small Business Set Asides,
36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 685, 686–87 (2007) (discussing the history of small business
set asides).
30. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 28, at 32; see Jonathan J. Bean, World War II
and the “Crisis” of Small Business; The Smaller War Plants Corporation,
1942–1946, 6 CAMBRIDGE J. POL’Y HIST. 215, 220–21 (2011) (discussing the
establishment of the SWPC).
31. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 28, at 32 (stating that the SWPC “offered
direct loans [and] encouraged financial institutions to provide credit to small
firms”).
32. See id. (“[The SWPC] urged federal agencies and big businesses to
increase the participation of small business in procurement contracts.”).
33. Bean, supra note 30, at 230.
34. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 28, at 32 (noting that the SWPC’s
“lending authority was dispersed due to criticism regarding its lack of
information and expertise”).
35. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 3 (2021) (citing An Act to Amend and Extend
the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Housing and Rent Act of 1947,
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After the SWPC and its successor, the SDPA, were
abolished, the Small Business Act of 1953 created the initial,
temporary version of the SBA.36 The Act transferred some of the
SDPA’s powers to the newly created SBA.37 This time, Congress
intended that the SBA would use its broad grant of powers in
peacetime in addition to when the nation was at war.38 The
SBA’s authority originally terminated on June 30, 1955.39 In
1958, Congress granted the SBA permanent agency status.40
Early powers of the SBA included its business and disaster loan
programs under sections 7(a) and (b);41 these programs have
lasted until the present day.42
Over time, Congress amended the SBA’s Enabling Act to
add additional programs. Particularly relevant to this Note is
an amendment passed in 1978, a decade after Martin Luther
King, Jr. was assassinated,43 with the Civil Rights Movement of
the 1960s in the intervening decade.44 In that amendment,
Congress updated the SBA’s Enabling Act “to give the SBA
express statutory authority for its 8(a) Program for
minority-owned businesses.”45 Over the years this has become
known simply as the 8(a) program, which provides contracting

Pub. L. No. 82-96, § 110, 65 Stat. 131, 139 (1951) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4501)).
36. See Small Business Act of 1953 § 221(a) (terminating the SBA’s
authority on June 30, 1955).
37. Id. § 104.
38. Id. § 207(a).
39. Id. § 221(a).
40. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 3 (2021); Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L.
85-536, § 2(a), 72 Stat. 384, 387 (July 18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631).
41. These loan programs existed as early as the 1953 Act, although the
section numbers did not become familiar until 1958. §§ 207(a)–(b), 67 Stat. at
235–36; §§ 7(a)–(b), 72 Stat. at 387–89.
42. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636 (authorizing the SBA to make
business and disaster loans).
43. Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
RSCH. & EDUC. INST., https://perma.cc/AUS6-UJRH.
44. See Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY.COM (Oct. 27, 2009),
https://perma.cc/J968-44MY (last updated Jan. 18, 2022) (detailing a timeline,
key events, and leaders of the Civil Rights movement).
45. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 5 (2021).
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assistance and set-asides to small businesses owned by an
individual who is a member of a minority group.46
In addition to contracting assistance for minority-owned
small businesses, Congress also granted the SBA authority to
provide support for service-disabled veteran-owned small
businesses (SDVOSB) in 1999.47 Congress created the SDVOSB
program as a reaction to public pressure for the government to
provide more assistance to veteran entrepreneurs.48 The
deployment of small business owners to the Gulf War had
economically injured their small businesses.49
Today, the SBA’s fingers are in a lot of pies. In addition to
the contracting assistance programs discussed above, the SBA
has programs for women-owned small businesses and small
businesses located in historically underutilized business
zones.50 The SBA facilitates a mentor-protégé program that
pairs small businesses with experienced government
contractors.51 The agency’s loan programs include the 7(a)
business loans and the 7(b) disaster loans mentioned supra, as
well as investment capital assistance, surety bonds, and
grants.52 It provides business guides to many different business
communities, and creates and disseminates online learning
46. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2022) (describing the purpose of the 8(a)
program).
47. See Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-50, § 502, 113 Stat 233, 247 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 644) (creating the SDVOSB program).
48. See id. § 101 (“The United States must provide additional assistance
and support to veterans to better equip them to form and expand small
business enterprises, thereby enabling them to realize the American dream
that they fought to protect.”).
49. See S. Rep. No. 106-136, at 3–4 (1999) (“The Committee [on Small
Business] believes that the SBA has not provided enough assistance to veteran
entrepreneurs . . . . During and after the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990’s
[sic], the Committee heard from reservists whose businesses were harmed,
severely crippled, or even lost, by their absence.”).
50. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contracting Program, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/T5JA-ED2C; HUBZone Program, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/SS9G-7W89.
51. SBA Mentor-Protégé Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/J8S9-CEVK.
52. See also Investment Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/3YGE-82BV; Surety Bonds, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/BUV7-JJY9;
Grants,
U.S.
SMALL
BUS.
ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/SS5V-ZXQ4.
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programs to educate business owners.53 While individuals have
critiqued many of the SBA programs,54 this Note will focus on
the exploitation of the 7(a) and 7(b) loan programs, as well as
the 8(a) and SDVOSB contracting assistance programs.
It is easy to see how the SBA came to oversee and regulate
so many varied programs. The small business has taken on a
mythological character in American culture.55 Because of the
widespread popularity of the small business, politicians have
virtually no choice but to hop on the small business
bandwagon.56 As a result, Congresspersons pass policies so they
can tell their constituents that they support small businesses,
and the SBA receives yet another program under its umbrella.
This Note provides a cautionary tale about the potential for
undesirable results when one agency regulates such a wide
range of business assistance programs, some of which are not
even restricted to small businesses.57
III. SBA PROGRAMS TODAY: A PRIMER
This Part introduces two of the SBA’s contracting
assistance programs and two of the SBA’s loan programs in
53. Business Guide, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/7T7N79B8; SBA Learning Platform, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/8B4MH3TV.
54. See, e.g., Denise Benjamin Sirmons, Federal Contracting with
Women-Owned Businesses: An Analysis of Existing Challenges and Potential
Opportunities, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 725, 768 (2004) (critiquing the effect of
recent acquisition reforms on the purpose of the Women-Owned Small
Business Program).
55. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 28, at 14, 24 (describing small businesses
as the “epitome of American liberty” and as “promot[ing] social justice”);
Miller, supra note 29, at 45 (“[T]he small businessman is one of our national
heroes, occupying a high place in the myth-system which makes the national
tradition.”); Bean, supra note 30, at 216 (“Small business has always had a
special place in the mythology of American democracy.”); Sakallaris, supra
note 29, at 685 (“[T]he small business set aside has become one of the most
sacred of the current sacred cows of the federal procurement scene.” (citations
omitted)).
56. See Frank Newport, Americans’ Views of Socialism, Capitalism Are
Little Changed, GALLUP (May 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/4T4B-CQ3R (reporting
that 96 percent of Americans have a positive image of small businesses).
57. See Disaster Assistance, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/F7M2YWCW (stating that “[b]usinesses of all sizes located in declared disaster
areas” can use an SBA disaster loan).
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more detail. For all the programs described below except the 7(b)
Disaster Loan Program,58 firms supposedly have to meet a
certain size standard depending on the industry in which they
conduct their business.59 After considering four SBA programs,
Part IV examines their continued exploitation by sophisticated
entities.
A.

8(a) Program

The 8(a) program is for economically and socially
disadvantaged business owners.60 “Socially disadvantaged,” as
defined by the statute, means the individual has “been subjected
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their
identity as a member of a group without regard to their
individual qualities.”61 Members of enumerated racial minority
groups, such as Alaska Natives, are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that they are socially disadvantaged.62 Individuals
whose race or ethnicity is not listed in the regulations can
“establish social disadvantage by a preponderance of the
evidence.”63
Economically disadvantaged means that the individual is
socially disadvantaged as defined above, and their “ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to
diminished capital and credit opportunities.”64 The statute
mandates that “[t]he net worth of an individual claiming
disadvantage must be less than $750,000,” but this excludes
several assets: the individual’s primary residence; funds
invested in an IRA or official retirement account; income (but
not losses) received from an 8(a) participant that is an
S-corporation, LLC, or partnership that is reinvested in the firm
or used to pay the firm’s taxes; and several other assets that
apply specifically to Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs)
58. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the SBA
to make disaster loans to businesses of any size).
59. North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS (2022),
https://perma.cc/BB4P-9AMB.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 637 (authorizing the 8(a) program).
61. Id. § 637(a)(5).
62. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b)(1) (2022).
63. Id. § 124.103(c)(1).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).
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discussed in greater detail infra.65 The 8(a) program is a
one-time program that lasts for nine years,66 although small
businesses may extend this period for one year if they were a
participant during the COVID-19 pandemic.67 Although the
statutory goal is for agencies to spend 5 percent of federal
contracting dollars on 8(a) businesses,68 over the past five years
agencies have spent 9.8 percent with 8(a)s.69 President Biden’s
goal is to increase this figure to 15 percent by fiscal year 2025.70
To meet this goal, the administration issued a memo directing
that 11 percent of total eligible contract spending will be
awarded to 8(a) businesses in fiscal year 2022.71 This proposed
increase makes the changes advocated in this Note even more
important to ensure that the increased federal dollars intended
for minority-owned small businesses are not instead spent with
larger businesses.
B.

SDVOSB Program

The SDVOSB program is for small businesses owned by
veterans “who possess[] either a valid disability rating letter
issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] . . . or a valid
disability determination from the Department of Defense.”72
65. See infra Part IV.B.
66. 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(c)(2) (2022).
67. See Extension of Participation in 8(a) Business Development
Program, 86 Fed. Reg. 2,529, 2,530 (Jan. 13, 2021) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R.
pt. 124) (“[F]or a firm participating in the 8(a) BD program as of March 13,
2020 and through January 13, 2021, SBA will extend its program term by one
year . . . .”).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(A)(iv) (“The Governmentwide goal for
participation by small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals shall be established at not less than 5
percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each
fiscal year.”).
69. See SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS FY2020 PRIME CONTRACTING,
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 1, https://perma.cc/N9KC-9UGN (PDF) (providing 8(a)
data from 2014 to 2020); Daniel Wilson, White House Ups Small Biz
Contracting Goals in Equity Push, LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2021, 8:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/5T5A-KCA2 (PDF) (averaging data for the past five years).
70. Jason S. Miller, Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies on Advancing Equity in Fed. Procurement 1 (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://perma.cc/669A-423Y.
71. Id. at 2.
72. 13 C.F.R. § 125.11 (2022).
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The business may also register in the VA’s database as a
service-disabled veteran.73 Additionally, “reservists or members
of the National Guard disabled from a disease or injury incurred
or aggravated in line of duty or while in training” qualify for the
SDVOSB program.74 To obtain SDVOSB status, firms merely
have to self-certify.75
The business must be “at least 51% unconditionally and
directly owned by one or more service-disabled veterans.”76 The
“management and daily business operations of the concern must
be controlled by one or more service-disabled veterans.”77
SDVOSBs can have multiple managers, but the “highest officer
position in the concern” must be held by the service-disabled
veteran.78 In the case of a partnership, at least one of the general
partners must obtain service-disabled veteran status.79 The VA
has a parallel program called “Vets First” with extremely
similar qualifications; however, the VA has a verification
process
that
requires
documentation
rather
than
self-certification.80
C.

7(a) Business Loan Program

In addition to contracting assistance programs, the SBA
also assists small businesses by providing business loans.81 The
7(a) program is meant for small businesses that are not able to
obtain funding from traditional sources.82 The Paycheck

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Veteran Assistance Programs, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/9GLA-WUWU (stating that owners “can self-certify [their]
business to the federal government as being owned by a service-disabled
veteran”).
76. 13 C.F.R. § 125.12 (2022).
77. Id. § 125.13(a).
78. Id. § 125.13(b).
79. Id. § 125.13(c).
80. 38 C.F.R. § 74.2 (2022).
81. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636.
82. See id. § 636(a) (authorizing the Business Loan Program, also known
as the 7(a) program).

BIG LITTLE LIES: LOOPHOLES

39

Protection Program (PPP) fell under the SBA’s 7(a) authority83
and was “designed to provide a direct incentive for small
businesses to keep their workers on the payroll” during the
pandemic.84 The first round of the program ran from February
15, 202085 to August 8, 2020;86 loans were made by banks and
guaranteed by the SBA.87 The SBA disbursed $523 billion
during the first round of the PPP.88 The SBA began disbursing
round two of the PPP on January 11, 2021.89 Round two ended
on May 31, 2021, although existing borrowers are still eligible
for PPP loan forgiveness.90

83. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L.
No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (Mar. 27, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 636).
84. Press Release, Small Business Administration, Paycheck Protection
Program
Forgiveness
Town
Hall
(July
27,
2020,
7:00PM),
https://perma.cc/6RMW-9DGB.
85. CARES Act § 1102.
86. Extending Authority for Commitments for the Paycheck Protection
Program and Separating Amounts Authorized, Pub. L. No. 116-147, § 1, 134
Stat. 660, 660 (July 4, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636). Note that in between
this Act, passed on the Fourth of July, and the CARES Act, Congress actually
extended the covered period of the PPP until December 31, 2020. Paycheck
Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat.
641, 641 (June 5, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636). However, Section 1102 of
Pub. L. No 116-147 walked the December 31 date back without explicitly
overruling it by only appropriating funding through August 8. § 1102(b)(1),
134 Stat. at 660.
87. Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Loan Data—Key Aspects, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 1, https://perma.cc/NV8G-6CES (PDF).
88. Stacy Cowley & Ella Koeze, 1 Percent of P.P.P. Borrowers Got Over
One-Quarter of the Loan Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8KDM-VJLA (last updated Oct. 11, 2021).
89. See Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and
Venues Act, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 304, 134 Stat. 1182, 1996 (2021) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 636) (restarting the PPP); Press Release, U.S. Small Business
Administration, PPP Reopens Jan 11 (Jan. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/UCF7DU99 (announcing that the SBA would reopen the PPP on January 11, 2021).
90. See PPP Extension Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-6, 135 Stat. 250
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636) (extending the PPP to June 30, 2021 but noting
that beginning on June 1 “the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration shall not accept new lender applications,” effectively ending
the program on May 31).
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7(b) Disaster Loan Program

The Disaster Loan Program, or the 7(b) program, provides
loans
to
businesses
and
homeowners
after
a
government-declared disaster.91 The Disaster Loan Program is
the only SBA program that is not limited to small businesses,92
so instead of discussing the exploitation of this program by large
businesses, this Note will discuss fraud in this program
generally. For example, the SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster
Loan Program (EIDL) was created in response to the pandemic,
and offers small businesses up to $2 million in loans.93 The EIDL
also distributed $20 billion in grants over the summer of 2020.94
IV. COMMON TRENDS ACROSS SBA PROGRAMS
The creation of SBA programs is cyclical. A problem arises
in society, and politicians in Congress become concerned. They
create new programs with catchy names95 in response to the
latest societal ill by amending the Small Business Act.96 Then,
Congress essentially steps out of the picture, benefitting from
all the political currency the one-off program generated. Once
Congress amends the Small Business Act, the creation of federal
regulations to implement the program lies with the SBA.97
Meanwhile, the Small Business Act remains a Frankenstein’s
monster of incongruous programs.
Each time Congress rushes to create complex systems in
response to small business contracting problems, the resulting

91. Disaster Assistance, supra note 57.
92. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the SBA
to make disaster loans to businesses of any size).
93. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-21-02,
INSPECTION OF SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S INITIAL DISASTER
ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC 1 (2020),
https://perma.cc/5DWP-HF7S (PDF).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub.
L. No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (Mar. 27, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 636) (nicknamed the CARES Act).
96. See id. (amending Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(6) (stating that the SBA Administrator may
make “rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the authority
vested in him by or pursuant to” the Small Business Act).
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programs are rife with opportunity for abuse. Forcing Congress
to reinvent the wheel each time leads to foreseeable, repeat
problems with the resulting programs. This Part will discuss the
issues that result when Congress, rather than the SBA, creates
new, complicated small business programs. These common
issues point to the fact that the real problem is the structure
through which Congress creates SBA programs. Many of the
instances of large businesses profiting from programs not meant
for them would resolve if the SBA utilized Congress’s original
grant of authority in the Small Business Act98 as a broad,
enabling superstructure under which to create its own
programs.99
A.

SBA Programs Are Reactionary and Short-Sighted

The first common problem is the reactionary and
short-sighted nature of SBA programs. This subpart discusses
the events that led to the hasty creation of SBA programs. Prime
examples of this phenomenon come from the SDVOSB program
and the PPP.
1.

The SDVOSB Program Was a Reaction to the Aftermath of
the Gulf War

In the late 1990s, the United States was reeling with the
aftereffects of the Gulf War.100 The SBA eliminated a direct loan
program for veterans in 1995,101 and the public was upset by this
98. See Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384, 387 (July
18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631) (describing the SBA’s authority as of the
1958 amendments giving it permanent agency status).
99. See infra Part V.
100. See Persian Gulf War, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/C5F4S7FR (last updated Jan. 9, 2022) (describing the Gulf War); Leonard Silk,
Economic Scene: The Broad Impact of the Gulf War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16,
1991), https://perma.cc/87AP-TH6Q (describing testimony from the director of
the Office of Management and Budget that the total cost of the Gulf War was
$61 billion and reporting that it “either triggered or aggravated the American
recession”). For a deeper dive on the impact of the war on the economy see The
Gulf War and the U.S. Economy, 91-31 FRBSF WKLY. LETTER (Sept. 13, 1991),
https://perma.cc/6YZH-UY86 (PDF).
101. See JAMES TALENT, VETERANS ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1999, H.R. REP. NO. 106-206, at 14 (1999)
(“Over the years, the interests of veterans, particularly the service-disabled,
have fallen on infertile ground.”); S. Rep. No. 106-136, at 3 (1999) (describing
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development because businesses owned by servicemembers had
recently suffered as a result of their owners deploying.102 As a
reaction to public outcry, Congress passed the Veterans
Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act in
1999, which established the SDVOSB program.103 At this time,
the Small Business Act already gave the SBA the authority to
craft rules and policies designed to assist veterans, but Congress
decided to add a program to the Act instead.104
Although the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small
Business Development Act set a goal of awarding 3 percent of
federal contracting dollars to SDVOSBs,105 it did not provide any
systems for agencies to reach this mandate.106 As a result,
agencies struggled to meet the 3 percent goal.107 From 1999 to
2003, only four government agencies were able to meet the
contracting goal as mandated by Congress.108 Instead of
Congress legislating the lengthy and complex SDVOSB
program, the SBA could have developed rules creating the
SDVOSB program using the original grant of authority from
Congress to “make such rules and regulations . . . necessary to
the necessity of more legislation to assist veterans because “[f]ederal support
for veterans entrepreneurs, particularly service-disabled veterans, has
declined”).
102. See S. Rep. No. 106-136, at 3–4 (1999) (“The Committee [on Small
Business] believes that the SBA has not provided enough assistance to veteran
entrepreneurs . . . . During and after the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990’s
[sic], the Committee heard from reservists whose businesses were harmed,
severely crippled, or even lost, by their absence.”); Veterans Entrepreneurship
and Small Business Development Act, Pub. L. No. 106-50, § 101, 113 Stat. 233,
234 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 657b) (“The United States must provide
additional assistance and support to veterans to better equip them to form and
expand small business enterprises, thereby enabling them to realize the
American dream that they fought to protect.”).
103. Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act
§ 502.
104. See Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384, 387 (July
18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631) (describing the SBA’s authority as of the
1958 amendments giving it permanent agency status).
105. Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act
§ 502(a)(2).
106. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 149.
107. Paul Sherman, Paved with Good Intentions: Obstacles to Meeting
Federal Contracting Goals for Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small
Businesses, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 125, 131 (2006).
108. Id.
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carry out the [Administrator’s] authority” under the Small
Business Act.109
2.

The PPP Was a Reaction to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Similarly, the PPP was one of a suite of stimulus packages
that Congress rolled out in response to the dire economic
situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.110 Like the
SDVOSB program, the PPP and its subsequent amendments
were incredibly complicated and difficult to interpret.111 As early
as 1958, section 7(a) of the Small Business Act granted the SBA
the power “to make loans . . . as may be necessary to insure [sic]
a well-balanced national economy.”112 Congress defined a
well-balanced economy as ensuring “that a fair proportion of the
total purchases and contracts . . . for property and services for
the
Government . . . be
placed
with
small-business
enterprises.”113 Rather than Congress legislating and
re-legislating, the SBA could have granted loans for small
businesses to use during the pandemic under this existing grant
of authority from Congress.114
109. Small Business Act of 1958 § 5(b)(6).
110. See Coronavirus Relief Options, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/9W6S-RRS5 (listing the different options for receiving
monetary assistance from the SBA if a business was adversely impacted by
the COVID-19 pandemic).
111. Since the CARES Act was passed in March 27, 2020, the PPP was
amended in June and July to extend the covered period of the program until
December 31, 2020, and to appropriate funding through August 8, 2020,
respectively. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (Mar. 27, 2020) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 636); Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L.
No. 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat. 641, 641 (June 5, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636);
Extending Authority for Commitments for the Paycheck Protection Program
and Separating Amounts Authorized, Pub. L. No. 116-147, § 1, 134 Stat. 660,
660 (July 4, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636). Congress also restarted the
PPP as of January 11, 2021. See Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses,
Nonprofits, and Venues Act, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 304, 134 Stat. 1182, 1996
(2021) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636) (restarting the PPP); Press Release, supra
note 89 (“The U.S. Small Business Administration, in consultation with the
Treasury Department, announced today that the Paycheck Protection
Program will re-open the week of January 11 for new borrowers and certain
existing PPP borrowers.”).
112. Small Business Act of 1958 § 7(a).
113. Id. § 2(a).
114. Id. § 7(a).
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Rushed Legislation Leads to Loopholes Benefitting Large
Businesses

One of the most common and repeated problems that
results from rushed115 and complicated programs is the
unintended creation of loopholes that enable agencies to spend
dollars with large, rather than small, businesses. The Alaska
Native Corporations (ANCs) are perhaps the most famous
entities to benefit from loopholes in the 8(a) program for socially
and economically disadvantaged business owners.116
1.

Loopholes in the 8(a) Program: Alaska Native
Corporations

In the normal 8(a) program, management must be a
member of the economically and socially disadvantaged
group.117 Managers of firms taking advantage of the ANC rules
do not have to be Alaska Natives at all.118 Owners of 8(a)
companies that are not ANCs must have a net worth of below
$750,000, excluding the individual’s primary residence, to meet
the economically disadvantaged requirement.119 On the other
hand, owners of ANCs are deemed economically disadvantaged
as long as Alaska Natives or their descendants “own a majority
of both the total equity of the ANC and the total voting powers
to elect directors of the ANC through their holdings of
settlement common stock[.]”120 Unlike the norm under the 8(a)
program, “individual contract awards to ANCs are completely
uncapped, remarkably even for contracts awarded on a

115. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
116. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b)(1) (2022) (codifying the rebuttable
presumption that Alaska Natives are socially disadvantaged under the 8(a)
program).
117. See id. § 124.101 (stating that a firm meets the 8(a) requirements “if
it is a small business which is unconditionally owned and controlled by one or
more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals”).
118. See id. § 124.109(c)(4)(i)(B) (“Management may be provided by
non-Tribal members if the concern can demonstrate that the Tribe can hire
and fire those individuals, that it will retain control of all management
decisions common to boards of directors . . . and that a written management
development plan exists . . . .”).
119. Id. § 124.104(c)(2).
120. Id. § 124.109(a)(1)–(2).
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sole-sourced basis.”121 They are also exempt from a total 8(a)
award ceiling.122
The most shocking loophole, however, is the fact that ANCs
do not need to be small businesses at all.123 This is possible
because “affiliations with the owning entity or other business
enterprises of that entity are excluded in size
determinations.”124 ANCs have grown at an unprecedented rate
as businesses have caught on to these immense statutory
benefits.125
2.

Loopholes in the PPP

Sophisticated entities also profit from loopholes in the
SBA’s loan programs. For example, the PPP did not force
recipients to use the loan to actually protect paychecks.126 In the
hotel industry, over 210 owners received a PPP loan, including
Omni Hotels & Resorts.127 Omni properties received anywhere
from $30 to $71 million while also laying off workers and ceasing
their health insurance coverage.128 The PPP was not restricted
to small businesses which were unable to obtain funding from
traditional sources129 and recipients were not required to use the
121. Daniel K. Oakes, Note, Inching Toward Balance: Reaching Proper
Reform of the Alaska Native Corporations’ 8(a) Contracting Preferences, 40
PUB. CONT. L.J. 777, 784 (2011) (citing 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b)).
122. See id.; CONG. RSCH. SERV. R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 21–22 (2021); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.519(a)
(describing dollar limits on the amount of 8(a) contracts program members
may receive but exempting ANCs).
123. Oakes, supra note 121, at 783.
124. CONG. RSCH. SERV. R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 17 (2021).
125. See Alaska Native Corporations, RES. DEV. COUNS. FOR ALASKA,
https://perma.cc/M2FH-GBYL (“Alaska Native corporations cumulatively
reported more than $10.5 billion in revenues in 2018 . . . .”).
126. Peter Whoriskey et al., ‘Doomed to Fail’: Why a $4 Trillion Bailout
Couldn’t Revive the American Economy, WASH. POST, https://perma.cc/WV7X8WM6 (last updated Oct. 5, 2020, 12:30 PM) (stating that loan recipients “were
not compelled to use [PPP loan dollars] to protect paychecks—and many
didn’t”).
127. Id.
128. See id. (noting that Omni took PPP money “while also furloughing
workers and cutting off their health insurance coverage”).
129. This is a requirement of the SBA’s Enabling Act for 7(a) financings.
Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636; Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
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funds to protect workers’ paychecks.130 A program without these
basic provisions benefitted sophisticated entities who used up
valuable program dollars intended for small businesses.131
Another loophole in the PPP stems from its prior
inconsistent application of rules depending on a business’s size.
When PPP round two began, it applied different rules to sole
proprietors, independent contractors, and self-employed
individuals than it did to businesses comprised of more than one
person.132 Specifically, sole proprietors, contractors, and
self-employed workers had to use a dollar amount from their
income tax form that reflected the amount of money their
business made after expenses to calculate how much they could
get from the PPP.133 Other small businesses could use the
amount of money their business made before expenses when
making the calculation, which was obviously much higher than
the net profit numbers from the single-employee companies.134
It is not clear why the SBA applied different rules depending on
how small a firm is; if anything, it should aim to assist smaller
firms equally or greater than larger businesses to stay in line
with congressional intent.135
Over fifty days after round two of the PPP began, the SBA
finally issued an interim final rule that fixed this loophole and
applied the same calculation rules to sole proprietors,
independent contractors, self-employed individuals, and larger

Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 291 (Mar.
27, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636).
130. See Whoriskey et al., supra note 126 (reporting that PPP recipients
were not required to use the money to protect employees’ paychecks).
131. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., Large, Troubled Companies Got
Bailout Money in Small-Business Loan Program, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/P7G3-BK55 (last updated May 13, 2020) (“Within days of [the
PPP’s] start, its money ran out. . . . Countless small businesses were shut out,
even as a number of large companies received millions of dollars in aid.”).
132. See David Hood, Self-Employed Businesses Seek Rule Tweaks for
Larger PPP Loans, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 17, 2021, 1:34 PM),
https://perma.cc/TYA2-88T7 (last updated Feb 17, 2021, 4:49 PM) (PDF)
(describing the rule discrepancy).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1) (“It is the declared
policy of the Congress that . . . the Small Business Administration . . . should
aid and assist small businesses . . . .”).
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small businesses.136 Following implementation of the rule, both
types of businesses were able to use gross profit numbers to
calculate how much they could receive from the PPP.137 The SBA
determined that it had discretion to make this change, and if it
had discretion in January when the PPP reopened, it is not clear
why it waited until March to fix this loophole.138
Single-employee companies only had two months to benefit
before the PPP ended on May 31, 2021,139 although the program
ran out of money a month after these smallest of small
businesses became eligible.140 Groups like the Main Street
Alliance and the National Association for the Self-Employed
have pointed out that single-employee firms missed out on a
large part of round two of the PPP because the change was not
retroactive.141
Over the summer of 2021, the Supreme Court interpreted
the CARES Act in a manner that created another loophole for
ANCs in addition to those discussed supra. The Department of
the Treasury and the Interior had determined that ANCs were
eligible for CARES Act funding.142 Seventeen tribes sued in
2020, arguing that Congress intended for CARES Act funding to
be restricted to sovereign tribal nations rather than Alaska
136. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection
Program–Revisions to Loan Amount Calculation and Eligibility, 86 Fed. Reg.
13,149, 13150–56 (Mar. 8, 2021) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
137. Id. at 13,150.
138. Id.
139. See id. (“Given the urgent need to provide borrowers with timely relief
and the short period of time before the program ends on March 31, 2021, SBA
in consultation with Treasury has determined that it is impractical and not in
the public interest to provide a 30-day delayed effective date.”); PPP Extension
Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-6, 135 Stat. 250 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636)
(extending the PPP to June 30, 2021 but noting that beginning on June 1 “the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall not accept new
lender applications,” effectively ending the program on May 31).
140. See Stacy Cowley, The Paycheck Protection Program Is Out of Money,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/7PHL-UZ2E (last updated Aug. 17,
2021) (describing how the PPP ran out of money “[f]our weeks before its
scheduled end” of May 31).
141. See Lydia O’Neal, PPP Loan Changes Expected to Open Doors for
Smallest Businesses, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 23, 2021, 4:46 AM),
https://perma.cc/B7J2-VEMY (stating that these groups are pushing Congress
and the SBA to make the rule change retroactive).
142. Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2438
(2021).
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Native Corporations,143 which as a reminder, non-Alaska
Natives can own.144 The District Court ruled that ANCs
qualified as “Indian Tribes” under the language of the statute.145
The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Congress meant to limit
the CARES Act to formally recognized tribes.146 In overturning
the D.C. Circuit, Justice Sotomayor concluded that “ANCs are
Indian tribes, regardless of whether they are also federally
recognized tribes.”147 The lawsuits “all but guarantee[d] that
some of the aid will remain frozen, leaving tribal citizens
without critical federal assistance.”148
Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation
resulted in ANCs becoming eligible to receive $450 million in
CARES Act funding.149 This is in addition to the potentially
unlimited set-aside contracts for which ANCs qualify under the
8(a) program.150 “The Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis
Reservation, the Tulalip Tribes, and other plaintiff tribes”
stated that they were “deeply disappointed” with the Court’s
ruling in Yellen.151 The President of the Navajo Nation noted
that “[t]he ruling undermines federally-recognized tribes and
will have consequences far beyond the allocation of CARES Act

143. Id. at 2441.
144. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4)(i)(B) (“Management may be provided by
non-Tribal members if the concern can demonstrate that the Tribe can hire
and fire those individuals, that it will retain control of all management
decisions common to boards of directors . . . and that a written management
development plan exists . . . .”).
145. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv. v. Mnuchin, 471 F. Supp. 3d 1,
20 (D.D.C. 2020).
146. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Rsrv. v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 15,
23 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
147. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. at 2443.
148. Mark Walker & Emily Cochrane, Native American Tribes Sue
Treasury Over Stimulus Aid as They Feud Over Funding (May 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3W6A-GRXH (last updated June 25, 2021).
149. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. at 2453–54 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Letter
from E. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May
12, 2021)) (noting that the funding “would otherwise find its way to recognized
tribal governments across the country, including Alaska’s several hundred
Native Villages”).
150. See supra Part IV.B.1.
151. Andrew Westney, Justices Say Alaska Native Cos. Can Get Tribal
COVID Funds (June 25, 2021, 10:33 AM), https://perma.cc/5RWR-VWX6.
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dollars.”152 Chairwoman Teri Gobin of the Tulalip Tribes stated
that the decision “makes it more important than ever that
Congress carefully craft legislation to ensure that federal
funding and programs are targeted to federally recognized
tribes and the Native communities they serve.”153
C.

The Disproportionate Racial Impact of SBA Programs

In addition to creating loopholes that enable large
businesses to profit, the disjointed way Congress creates SBA
programs is systemically biased to favor majority over minority
racial groups. This subsection examines this phenomenon by
comparing the 8(a) program, meant to aid minority-owned small
businesses in obtaining federal government contracts,154 with
other SBA contracting assistance programs.
1.

The Government Disproportionately Limits Aid to
Minority-Owned Small Businesses

Businesses with SDVOSB certifications can qualify for
lucrative set-aside contracts for an unlimited amount of time, as
long as they remain owned and controlled by a service-disabled
veteran.155 SDVOSBs merely need to self-certify to this fact.156
Likewise, the SBA’s Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB)
program, briefly discussed in this Note’s Introduction, operates
in the same way.157 Small businesses owned by women can
simply submit some verifying information to the SBA,158 and
annually represent to the SBA that it continues to meet all

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See 8(a) Business Development Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/2UZ2-BEMZ (stating that the 8(a) program was created to
“help firms owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals . . . compete effectively in the American economy”).
155. 13 C.F.R. § 125.12 (2022); § 125.13(a)–(b) (2022).
156. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses Program, supra
note 75.
157. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contracting Program, supra
note 50.
158. 13 C.F.R. § 127.300 (2022).
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WOSB eligibility criteria.159 Thereafter, they perpetually qualify
for federal set-aside contracts.160
When Congress amended the Small Business Act to add on
the 8(a) program for minority-owned small businesses, and the
SBA implemented the program,161 it carefully crafted limiting
conditions on this federal grant of aid to minorities. The most
obvious example is the fact that the program only lasts for nine
years, as opposed to perpetually like the SDVOSB and WOSB
programs.162 Additionally, the net worth of the minority
business owner must be below $750,000.163 If the 8(a) business
is too successful during its nine-year stint, it gets kicked out of
the 8(a) program and may no longer benefit from lucrative
set-aside contracts.164
A subtler racially-charged barrier 8(a) firms face is the
paternalistic prohibition on excessive withdrawals by an 8(a)
participant.165 Federal regulations state that “[i]f SBA
determines that funds or assets have been excessively
withdrawn from the Participant for the personal benefit of one
or more owners or managers . . . and such withdrawal was
detrimental to the achievement of the targets, objectives, and
goals contained in the Participant’s business plan,” the SBA can
terminate the business from the 8(a) program.166 The
regulations define excessive withdrawals based on the small
business’s sales; the higher the sales, the more a Participant can
withdraw.167 While the SBA usually does not count officers’
salaries towards the withdrawal total, it will count salaries
“where SBA believes that a firm is attempting to circumvent the

159. Id. § 127.400.
160. Id.
161. CONG. RSCH. SERV. R44844, SBA’S “8(A) PROGRAM”: OVERVIEW,
HISTORY, AND CURRENT ISSUES 5 (2021); see 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2022) (describing
the purpose of the 8(a) program).
162. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2022).
163. Id. § 124.104(c)(2).
164. Id. § 124.104(c).
165. Id. § 124.112(d).
166. Id. § 124.112(d)(2).
167. See id. § 124.112(d)(3) (“Withdrawals are excessive if in the aggregate
during any fiscal year of the Participant they exceed (i) $250,000 for firms with
sales up to $1,000,000; (ii) $300,000 for firms with sales between $1,000,000
and $2,000,000; and (iii) $400,000 for firms with sales exceeding $2,000,000.”).
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excessive withdrawal limitations through the payment of
officers’ salaries.”168 Taken together, these restrictions are
insulting to the intelligence of the minority small business
owner because they disallow the owner from determining for
himself or herself how much to withdraw from their own
business.
Similar restrictions do not apply to the SDVOSB
program or the WOSB.169 There is no reason for the three
programs to have different rules, however, because being a
member of a minority group, like being a service-disabled
veteran or a woman, is an immutable characteristic. The
nine-year limitation on the length of the 8(a) program is an
arbitrary restriction, as if, in the government’s eyes, minority
small business owners will not experience bias or racism in
federal procurement after a nine-year period of government
assistance. The net worth requirement is likewise illogical. Does
the government fear that a minority-owned small business will
become “too” successful? John Shoraka argues that the excessive
withdrawal rule shows how the government treats 8(a)
participants “like grade school children that can’t survive
without their hands being held by the all-knowing and
all-protective federal government.”170
2.

The Government Disproportionately Punishes Perceived
Exploitation of the 8(a) Program

The government also stringently enforces perceived fraud
in the 8(a) program, with the exception of ANCs.171 R&W
Builders, Inc. recently settled with the United States
government for $400,000.172 R&W had graduated from the 8(a)
program and formed a joint venture with a current 8(a)

168. Id. § 124.112(d)(1). The standard of review is totality of the
circumstances. Id.
169. See id. §§ 125.12–14, 127.400 (describing the requirements for WOSB
and SDVOSB to maintain their certifications).
170. John Shoraka, Why Systemic Bias Exists in Government Contracting
Programs, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 10, 2021, 12:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/V7C4-BHJK.
171. See supra Part IV.B.
172. Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Off., Southern Dist. of Ill., O’Fallon
Building Co. Settles Fraud Claims (Feb. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/7RKVRG98.

52

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2022)

participant called Global Environmental, Inc.173 Together, they
created Patriot Commercial Construction, LLC.174 Once Patriot
secured a set-aside contract, R&W began to manage the joint
venture and use its employees, rather than employees of the
current 8(a) company, to complete the contract work.175
Although a typical marketplace would encourage a joint venture
created to use the most experienced workers for a job, in this
case the U.S. government prosecuted R&W with all the force of
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for violating the False Claims Act.176
After proudly listing the almost half a million dollar settlement,
the press release stated, “[i]t is important that 8(a) joint
ventures comply with the SBA’s criteria because misuse of the
Program deprives real disadvantaged businesses of valuable
economic opportunities and undermines the Program’s
integrity.”177 Despite a minority individual still owning R&W,
R&W was no longer considered really disadvantaged because it
had exceeded its nine year allocation.
3.

ANC Loopholes Enable Majority Groups to Profit from the
8(a) Program

The exploitation of the 8(a) program by ANCs is another
example of the disproportionate racial impact of SBA programs.
As discussed in Part IV.B above, ANCs are exempt from almost
every limitation of the 8(a) program. The three most glaring
holes in the statutory scheme are the facts that Alaska Natives
do not have to own ANCs,178 ANCs do not need to be small
businesses,179 and ANCs can perpetually qualify for lucrative
8(a) set-aside contracts.180 The upshot of these statutory
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (codifying the False Claims Act).
177. Press Release, supra note 172 (emphasis added).
178. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4)(i)(B) (2022) (“Management may be
provided by non-Tribal members if the concern can demonstrate that the Tribe
can hire and fire those individuals, that it will retain control of all
management decisions common to boards of directors . . . and that a written
management development plan exists . . . .”).
179. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
180. An ANC’s size is determined “independently without regard to its
affiliation with the tribe, any entity of the tribal government, or any other
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provisions is that they create the potential for white people,
rather than Alaska Natives, to own ANCs.181 They enable white
people, rather than Alaska Natives, to perpetually profit off of a
program meant to assist minority individuals.182 As a result,
each set-aside an ANC wins takes federal dollars away from a
“real” disadvantaged small business.183
4.

The PPP Was Inaccessible to Many Minority-Owned Small
Businesses

A final example of SBA programs having a disproportionate
racial impact is the initial inconsistent application of PPP rules
depending on a business’s size. As discussed in Part IV.B, sole
proprietors, contractors, and self-employed workers previously
qualified for lower PPP loans than small businesses with more
than one employee.184 Ashley Harrington of the Center for
Responsible Lending argued that this rule difference had a
disproportionate impact on minority single-worker companies,
because most of these companies are owned by Black and Latino
people.185 While the SBA has now changed this inconsistency in
an interim final rule,186 the fact that the limitation existed in
the first place is indicative of the systemic bias in SBA
programs.187

business enterprise owned by the tribe[.]” 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii). As a
result of this loophole, ANCs have a habit of creating a spinoff affiliate that
qualifies under the 8(a) program each time they are about to exceed their nine
years. See, e.g., Chenega Corporation Company Hierarchy, supra note 3
(documenting Chenega’s thirty subsidiaries and related entities). The
regulations themselves provide a potential solution that the SBA rarely uses
in practice: the SBA determines an ANC’s size without regard to affiliations
“unless the Administrator determines that one or more such tribally-owned
business concerns have obtained, or are likely to obtain, a substantial unfair
competitive advantage within an industry category.” 13 C.F.R.
§ 124.109(c)(2)(iii).
181. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4)(i)(B) (stating that non-Tribal members
may manage ANCs if the Tribe retains some control over the manager).
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
185. David Hood, supra note 132.
186. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
187. To its credit, the interim final rule recognizes this fact. It states
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The heightened barriers that apply to the 8(a) program
support the notion that the federal government wants to help
minority groups, but only for a certain amount of time before it
removes them from Uncle Sam’s payroll.188 Meanwhile,
businesses owned by women and service-disabled veterans are
able to profit from set-aside contracts for an unlimited amount
of time.189 The 8(a) program allows Congresspersons to gain the
political currency of assisting minority individuals, without
actually effecting a systemic change. If the Biden
administration is as serious as it appears about tackling issues
of racial inequity, it needs to swiftly remedy these disparities in
federal procurement.190
This change would affect many sole proprietors who have been
effectively excluded from the PPP, especially those with very little
or negative net profit, many of which are located in underserved
communities. [Sole proprietors] have higher concentrations of
ownership by members of underserved groups. An analysis by the
SBA Office of Advocacy of Census data found that firms with no
employees are 70 percent owned by women and minorities,
compared to 40 percent for businesses with employees. SBA has
determined that changing the calculation for sole proprietors,
independent contractors, and self-employed individuals will reduce
barriers to accessing the PPP and expand funding among the
smallest businesses.
Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Revisions to Loan Amount Calculation and Eligibility, 86 Fed. Reg. 13,149,
13,150 (Mar. 8, 2021) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120). The SBA may have
made this change too little, too late, however, because the rule change was
effective for only two months before round two of the PPP ended. See PPP
Extension Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-6, 135 Stat. 250 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 636) (extending the PPP to June 30, 2021 but noting that beginning on June
1 “the Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall not accept
new lender applications,” effectively ending the program on May 31).
188. This notion plays into the meritocracy myth, or the belief that
rewards in our society go to the hardest worker. See, e.g., Anne Lawton, The
Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85
MINN. L. REV. 587, 590 (2000) (“The meritocracy myth reflects dominant
cultural assumptions about employment opportunity and success, and is
comprised of two interconnected beliefs. The first is an assumption that
employment discrimination is an anomaly. The second is a belief that merit
alone determines employment success.”).
189. See supra notes 155–160 and accompanying text.
190. See Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,009 (Jan. 25, 2021)
(describing the Biden administration’s comprehensive policy on “advancing
racial equity and support for underserved communities through the federal
government”).
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Anemic Fraud Controls

In addition to a disproportionate racial impact, the current
structure through which Congress creates SBA programs leads
to an increased opportunity for fraud. Many existing SBA
programs are vulnerable to abuse, but instead of learning from
past exploitations, each new program remarkably lacks fraud
controls. It is worth mentioning here that some of the
exploitation may be behavioral; that is, with any government
contracting program there is the potential for bad actors to
swoop in and take advantage. However, this Note argues that
the frequency and commonality of fraud in SBA programs is
largely preventable.
1.

Fraud in the SDVOSB Program

The first example of lack of fraud controls comes from the
SDVOSB program. Two companies and a joint venture were
owned by a service-disabled veteran and two non-service
disabled veterans at the same location.191 As a reminder, a
service-disabled veteran must directly own and control a
SDVOSB, but they only need to self-certify to this status.192
Despite this mandate, the operating agreements of the two firms
allowed the non-service-disabled veterans to control the
companies.193 Additionally, the service-disabled veteran did not
manage the joint venture.194 The three companies together
received over $91 million in SDVOSB contracts.195 To prevent
this waste of government resources, the SBA could easily update
the regulations to enact fraud controls, such as requiring
documentation of service-disabled status of management and
control rather than self-certification.196

191. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-697, SERVICE-DISABLED
VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM: VULNERABILITY TO FRAUD AND
ABUSE REMAINS 22 (2012).
192. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
193. GAO-12-697, supra note 191 at 22–23.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. The VA has a
verification process that requires documentation rather than self-certification.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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2.

Fraud in the PPP

In addition to profiting from the SBA’s contracting
assistance programs, large and sophisticated entities also
exploit the agency’s loan programs. The PPP was passed under
the SBA’s 7(a) program,197 which was intended for small
businesses that are not able to obtain funding from traditional
sources.198 Instead, large businesses signed up: the SBA issued
individual loans from $5 to $10 million to around 5,000
businesses.199 Among these companies were the expensive sushi
restaurant in the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C., Kanye
West’s company, and President Trump’s personal lawyer.200 Big
law firms also received between $210 million and $425 million
from the program.201 In December 2021, the Secret Service
announced that the total amount stolen from the PPP was up to
$100 billion.202
Fraud was so widespread during the first round of PPP
loans that the SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG) teamed up
with the Department of Treasury to issue a PPP fraud report.203

197. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L.
No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (Mar. 27, 2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 636).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (authorizing the Business Loan Program, also
known as the 7(a) program).
199. Jeanna Smialek et al., Lobbyists, Law Firms and Trade Groups Took
Small-Business Loans, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/DZX7UXZ2 (last updated July 7, 2020).
200. Id.
201. Roy Strom, Boies Schiller, Big Law Firms Obtained Millions in PPP
Loans, BLOOMBERG L. (July 6, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://perma.cc/D8L9-7HL5
(last updated July 6, 2020, 6:38 PM).
202. See Press Release, U.S. Secret Service Names National Pandemic
Fraud Recovery Coordinator to Bolster Fight Against Fraud, U.S. Secret
Service (Dec. 21, 2021) (stating that the Service appointed an agent to
investigate and recover the “fraudulent use of COVID-19 relief applications,
with potential fraudulent activity nearing $100 billion”); Andrew Ackerman &
Amara Omeokwe, Covid-19 Relief Fraud Potentially Totals $100 Billion,
Secret Service Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2021, 5:58 PM),
https://perma.cc/3C83-JMRW (“Some $100 billion has potentially been stolen
from Covid-19 relief programs designed to help individuals and businesses
harmed by the pandemic, the U.S. Secret Service said.”).
203. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-21-06,
PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOAN RECIPIENTS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
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The OIG is an independent department within the SBA that
provides oversight via auditing and investigation.204 The Report
found that the SBA granted approximately $3.6 billion in PPP
loans to potentially ineligible recipients.205 Treasury maintains
a “Do Not Pay List” in an online portal.206 The database accesses
multiple federal data sources to track whether a business has
any current federal debarments or suspensions or federal loans
for which the business is delinquent or has defaulted.207 The
Report recommends that “SBA should take immediate action to
limit improper payments by strengthening existing controls and
implementing additional internal controls to address improper
payments, especially through the utilization of existing
resources.”208
For the second round of the PPP, the SBA checked all PPP
applicants against the Do Not Pay List and required lenders to
do the same.209 However, some of the other round two changes
potentially increased the possibility of fraud and waste.210
Although round two applicants are supposed to show that their
revenues were down by at least 25 percent in the first, second,
or third quarter of 2020, the SBA does not require applicants for
loans of $150,000 or less to provide verifying documentation.211
Applicants in this dollar range comprise the vast majority of
total applicants.212 There is also no evidence that documenting
lost revenue would be unduly burdensome on round two PPP
applicants.213
TREASURY’S DO NOT PAY LIST (2021) [hereinafter PPP Fraud Report],
https://perma.cc/8WBN-C9TT (PDF).
204. About the Office of Inspector General, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/P4WQ-AFKJ; see infra Part V.B.
205. PPP Fraud Report, supra note 203, at 2.
206. Id. at 2–3.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id. at 11.
210. See Geoff Colvin, Round 2 of PPP Loans Could Be Open to Even More
Fraud, FORTUNE (Jan. 12, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://perma.cc/W378-MXYH
(describing how Round 2 of the PPP “invites more fraud” than Round 1).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. (“Getting the SBA to forgive Round 1 loans demanded that
borrowers fill out three forms and a worksheet, supported by five pages of
instructions, and submit potentially dozens of documents. Under the new law,
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All of this fraud was possible because Congress rushed out
COVID-19 relief legislation, which left states and the SBA, who
actually implemented the programs, in the lurch.214 To try to
dole money out as quickly as possible, the PPP did not require
applicants to prove they had been harmed by the pandemic.215
The SBA could have easily checked the Do Not Pay List from the
beginning—the law may have required it to do so anyway—or
the SBA could have implemented even slightly heightened
documentation requirements.216
Rather than having the SBA process loan applications, it
delegated this authority to banks, who could collect fees for each
loan they made.217 However, neither the SBA nor the banks
were required to monitor whether the loan recipients were using
PPP dollars for protecting paychecks.218 This is true of almost
all SBA loans: rather than the SBA making the loan directly to
the small business, the SBA instead uses “lending partners” and
guarantees to the bank that the small business will repay the
loan.219 Every intermediary the SBA introduces between the
overarching program and the aid recipient adds to the program’s
intricacy and, accordingly, to the opportunity for fraud.220
3.

Fraud in the Disaster Loan Program: The EIDL

The 7(b) Disaster Loan Program has likewise not been
spared from deception. In response to the pandemic, Congress
borrowers of $150,000 or less can get full forgiveness by submitting a one-page
certification.”).
214. See Timothy L. O’Brien, Opinion, Fraud and Ineptitude Are
Undermining Covid Relief, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 13, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/2GR2-UTBD (describing the passage of the CARES Act as a
“well-intentioned rush”).
215. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., supra note 131.
216. See Payment Integrity Information Act, Pub. L. No. 116-117, § 3352,
134 Stat. 113, 114–15 (2020) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3352) (requiring agencies
to conduct risk assessments if, in the prior fiscal year, the sum of the agency’s
improper payments may have exceeded $10 million).
217. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., supra note 131.
218. See id. (stating that banks did not have to “monitor whether the
recipients use[d] the money appropriately”).
219. See Loans, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/V3M3-HLZX.
220. O’Brien, supra note 214 (arguing that the SBA’s use of banks as
lending partners adds to the PPP’s “complexity and therefore to the possibility
of errors or fraud”).
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granted the SBA the authority to administer the EIDL program
under the SBA’s 7(b) authority.221 The EIDL program provides
loans of up to $2 million to small businesses, farms, nonprofits,
and other eligible entities.222 Like the PPP, the EIDL was
rushed out; an Office of Inspector General Report stated that the
SBA “‘lowered the guardrails’ by removing or weakening []
controls” to expedite the loan disbursement process.223 The
report found that over the summer of 2020, the SBA approved
$14.3 billion “to applicants who later changed the bank account
number to pay out the loan to a different number than that
listed on the original loan application,” an indicator of potential
fraud.224 Additionally, the SBA “approved more than one loan to
applicants that used the same IP addresses, email addresses,
business address, or bank accounts” for a total of $62.7 billion.225
Amazingly, “SBA’s management continues to insist that its
controls are robust despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.”226
When Congress passes complex legislation to address
socioeconomic disparity, the common trends across SBA
programs described above emerge. Congress drafts one-off small
businesses assistance programs that are reactionary and
short-sighted.227 This leads to glaring statutory loopholes, which
in turn qualifies large businesses for SBA programs.228 The
legislation also has a disproportionate racial impact.229 It lacks
controls
that
could
address
foreseeable
fraudulent
exploitation.230 Congress has tied the SBA’s hands when it
comes time to implement each program. SBA programs have the
capability to assist small businesses, and can be improved.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(9)(C).
OIG-21-02, supra note 93, at 1.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 31.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.D.
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E.

Program Success Stories

It would be irresponsible to deny that SBA programs do
some good for the small business community. The SBA created
an entire online platform to share these success stories in
2016.231 Despite its exploitation and dubious timeframe,232 the
8(a) program actually does enable some minority business
owners to break into the government contracts market. For
example, two friends, one of whom is Native American, founded
PC Mechanical and were accepted into the 8(a) program.233 They
won multiple government contracts, including a $140 million
multi-year contract, using their 8(a) certification.234 After
graduating from the 8(a) program, they were able to buy a larger
facility and continue to receive government contracts.235
The same goes for the SDVOSB program. The SBA was
instrumental in assisting Scott Allen and his business Wisdom
Tree Technologies.236 Despite having obtained both an 8(a) and
SDVOSB certification, Wisdom Tree struggled to obtain federal
contracts.237 Allen contacted his local SBA office and was
connected with a Business Opportunity Specialist, who provided
tailored
guidance
about
the
federal
procurement
marketplace.238 Wisdom Tree quickly received a small federal
contract that translated into larger contracts as a result of the
SBA’s assistance.239
While the news is replete with instances of fraud in the
PPP, it also helped many small businesses keep employees on
the payroll during the pandemic. An owner of a bakery described
the PPP her business received as “an umbrella of financial

231. See Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., New SBA Platform Lets
Small Businesses Tell Their Stories (Sept. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/8RHFKRGM (describing the SBA’s “Small Business Owners Speak” platform).
232. See infra Part IV.C.
233. Small Business Owner Finds Success and Growth with 8(a) Program,
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/JYS3-B3F4.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Persistence Pays Off for Native American SDVOSB, an SBA 8(a)
Business, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/UFV4-N2M7.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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safety for the employees and the business.”240 The owner
contacted her preexisting business advisor who helped her make
an informed decision about securing a PPP loan.241 Additionally,
there is at least some evidence that the SBA was responsive to
concerns about fraud in the first round of the PPP. For example,
during the PPP’s second round, the SBA, in its own words,
“developed systems to screen potential borrowers against the
Treasury Department’s Do Not Pay List.”242 Applications
processed through a lender were also searched against the
list.243 Similar stories have come out of the EIDL program under
the SBA’s disaster loan authority.244
Veronique de Rugy has suggested that Congress should
abolish the SBA because it is such a waste of money.245 This
Note does not go that far. Instead, it suggests a fundamental
shift in the way the SBA uses the Small Business Act to achieve
its goal of helping small businesses.246 The goal is for the SBA to
grow its bank of success stories, while tamping down on
exploitation by larger businesses.
V.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT

This Part will first suggest that, rather than Congress
adding new SBA programs in response to crises as they arise,
the SBA could use the Small Business Act as a broad, enabling
superstructure to pass federal regulations to assist small
businesses. To this end, Congress could amend the Small
Business Act to look more like it did in 1958, before it contained

240. Bellingham Bakery Utilizes SBA Resources and PPP Loan to Spread
Joy Through Cake, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/QU2G-NJG6.
241. Id.
242. PPP Fraud Report, supra note 203, at 11.
243. See id. (containing the statement of then-SBA Administrator Jovita
Carranza).
244. See, e.g., Fairmont Businesses Uses Paycheck Protection Program to
Navigate Storm, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/6MXH-M2SN
(describing how a West Virginia training on the PPP and EIDL helped one
business owner obtain the loans and keep her fourteen employees on payroll
during the pandemic).
245. See Editorial, Should the Small Business Administration Be
Abolished, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2012, 3:58 PM), https://perma.cc/J8EA-TUMT
(exploring the debate on both sides).
246. See infra Part V.A.
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a patchwork of lengthy, complex, and specific programs. In 1958,
the SBA had the broad authority to “make such rules and
regulations” as were necessary to “aid, counsel, assist, and
protect . . . the interests of small-business concerns” to increase
competition for federal contracts.247 Because this proposal is
likely far away from happening, this Note, in Part V.B, points to
some long and short term solutions fixes that Congress and the
SBA could deploy in the meantime. This Part will begin with a
discussion of the long-term solution: amending the Small
Business Act.
A.

Amending the Small Business Act and its Regulatory Role

This Note proposes that Congress amend the Small
Business Act to reflect the following three long-term changes:
(1) amend Sections 7 and 8 to create a general framework that
empowers the SBA to make its own rules, (2) only allow the SBA
to make Disaster Loans through lending partners and require it
to make all other types of loans directly, and (3) require SBA
programs to comply with the Act itself.
1.

Make the Enabling Act Enabling, Rather than Prescriptive

As early as 1958 when Congress granted the SBA
permanent agency status, its policy was “to insure [sic] that a
fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property
and services for the Government . . . be placed with
small-business enterprises . . . .”248 The Small Business Act of
1958 gave the SBA broad authority “to arrange for the
performance of [] contracts [with the United States
Government] by negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts to
small-business concerns . . . .”249 To accomplish these goals,
Congress gave the SBA authority to “make such rules and
regulations as [it] deem[ed] necessary to carry out the authority
vested in [it] by or pursuant to” the Small Business Act.250 Under
Section 7 of the Act, the SBA has the power to make rules and
247. Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, §§ 2(a), 5(b)(6), 72 Stat.
384, 384, 386 (July 18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631).
248. Id. § 2(a).
249. Id. § 8(a)(2).
250. Id. § 5(b)(6).
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regulations for its loan programs.251 Likewise, Section 8 of the
Act gives the SBA authority to create and administer
contracting assistance programs.252
Despite granting this authority to the SBA, Congress has
taken control by amending the Small Business Act to add on a
hodgepodge of complicated programs that prove difficult for the
SBA to administer and contain loopholes that allow large
businesses to profit.253 A better approach would be for the SBA
to utilize the existing statutory framework of the Small
Business Act to create small business programs by
promulgating its own regulations. If the SBA used its existing
grant of authority from Congress, it could potentially reduce
each program’s vulnerability to fraud by decreasing the
complexity of the programs.254
Because the Small Business Act is currently lengthy and
program-specific,255 however, Congress would need to initially
amend both sections to create a general framework under which
the SBA could make rules. Congress would also need to ensure
that this general framework amendment came with enough
funding for the SBA to make meaningful rules and
regulations.256 This change is less daunting than it appears at
first glance; the general framework existed in the 1958 Small
Business Act.257
This initial legislative investment would pay off, because
once Congress amends the Small Business Act to include a

251. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636.
252. Id. § 637.
253. See supra Part IV.
254. O’Brien, supra note 214.
255. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 637 (listing out specific contracting assistance
programs).
256. Congress often issues unfunded mandates, rather than appropriate
funding with positive legislative changes. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40957,
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT: HISTORY, IMPACT, AND ISSUES 1–2
(describing the history of unfunded mandates). Accordingly, all of the proposed
changes in Part V. would need to come with enough funding to make them a
reality.
257. The Small Business Act of 1958 contains just twenty-one sections and
takes up just twelve pages in the Statutes at Large. Small Business Act of
1958, Pub. L. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384–396 (July 18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 631). By contrast, as of this writing the Small Business Act contains ninety
lengthy sections. 15 U.S.C. Ch. 14A.
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general framework for loan and contracting assistance
programs, the SBA would be able to create rules for the existing
and new programs as the need arises, keeping the small
business regulation within the agency tasked with the
regulation of small businesses. Congress formed the SBA as an
administrative agency to create rules and regulations that
would ensure a fair percentage of the Government’s spending
power benefitted small businesses.258 When making small
business rules and regulations, the SBA is required to follow the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).259 The SBA must provide
the public with notice and the opportunity to comment on any
proposed rulemaking at least thirty days before the rule’s
effective date.260 Under the APA, the SBA has the capacity to
solicit comments from key stakeholders impacted by the
proposed rule before it becomes final.261 The SBA accordingly
258. Small Business Act of 1958 § 2(a).
259. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59.
260. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(d). The SBA also has the ability to skip the notice
and comment period if it “for good cause finds” that issuing a proposed rule
and holding a comment period would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.” Id. § (b)(3)(B), (d)(3). The SBA followed these
expedited rulemaking procedures to enable sole proprietors to immediately
benefit from the same revenue calculation as their larger-sized counterparts
when the PPP was running out of time. See supra Part IV.B.2; Business Loan
Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Additional
Eligibility Revisions to First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,301, 38,302
(June 26, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120)
SBA has determined that there is good cause for dispensing with
advance public notice and comment on the grounds that that [sic] it
would be contrary to the public interest. Specifically, advance public
notice and comment would defeat the purpose of this interim final
rule given that SBA’s authority to guarantee PPP loans expires on
June 30, 2020. These same reasons provide good cause for SBA to
dispense with the 30-day delayed effective date provided in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Id.
261. For example, the SBA issued a controversial interim final rule on
April 15, 2020 that prohibited a PPP applicant from applying if
[a]n owner of 20 percent or more of [] equity . . . is incarcerated, on
probation, on parole; presently subject to an indictment, criminal
information, arraignment, or other means by which formal criminal
charges are brought in any jurisdiction; or has been convicted of a
felony within the last five years.
Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program,
85 Fed. Reg. 20,811, 20,812 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
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gains small business expertise it can utilize when creating the
final rule. This rulemaking process could create better outcomes
for small businesses than the current process of Congress
creating lengthy and complicated programs and then handing
them to the SBA to administer.
2.

Require the SBA to Make All Loans Except for Disaster
Loans Directly

Changes to the way the SBA doles out money would also
prevent large businesses from profiting from SBA programs.
Ever since the SBA became a permanent agency in 1958,262
Congress has empowered it to give loans to small businesses
“either directly or in cooperation with banks or other financial
institutions.”263 Currently, the SBA only makes Disaster Loans
directly.264 However, because the Disaster Loan program is the
only SBA program that is not limited to small businesses,265 the
SBA could issue these loans through banks rather than directly.

Several criminal justice organizations commented on the rule, urging “the SBA
to reconsider those provisions of the Rule that discriminate against individuals
who have a record of arrest or conviction.” Am. C.L. Union et. al., Comment
Letter on Business Loan Program Temporary Changes (May 15, 2020),
https://perma.cc/U6ZZ-AXZZ. In response to these kinds of comments, as well
as a lawsuit alleging that the criminal record exclusion violated the APA, the
SBA ultimately revised the rule to only exclude owners facing felony charges
from the past year or facing felony charges involving lying on a loan
application in the past five years. Business Loan Program Temporary
Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Additional Eligibility Revisions to
First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,301, 38,302 (June 26, 2020) (to be
codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120); see Defy Ventures, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,
469 F. Supp. 3d 459, 475 (D. Md. 2020) (finding that “[t]he plaintiffs [were]
likely to show that the SBA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating
the April IFR . . . because [that] rule[] contain[s] no explanation for the
criminal history exclusion”).
262. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
263. Small Business Act of 1958 § 7(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631)
(emphasis added). This is the same language that appears in the most current
version of the Small Business Act. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a).
264. See GUIDE TO SBA PROGRAMS, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 22 (last
updated Feb. 2013), https://perma.cc/2JTX-W64L (PDF) (describing how the
Disaster Loan Program is administered directly from the SBA to afflicted
businesses of any size).
265. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.: SEMIANNUAL REP. TO
CONG. 9 (Apr. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/28MT-T7Z7 (PDF).
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This change would distribute money as quickly as possible to
any qualifying business after a disaster.
The SBA administers all of its other loans, including the
PPP, indirectly by requiring small businesses to apply through
banks.266 These programs are only meant to assist small
businesses under Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act.267
Experience teaches that requiring recipients to apply for SBA
loans through banks, rather than to the SBA itself, decreases
the certainty that the money will actually end up with small
businesses because the SBA’s oversight is dramatically
decreased.268 To give the SBA the most oversight and streamline
the loan application process, Congress could amend the Small
Business Act to require the SBA to make all of its loan programs
except for Disaster Loans directly.269 The level of control the
SBA would have if it made most of its loans directly would
enable it to ensure that only qualified small businesses receive
small business loans.270

266. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (authorizing the SBA to make business loans
“either directly or in cooperation with banks or other financial institutions
through agreements to participate on an immediate or deferred (guaranteed)
basis”).
267. See GUIDE TO SBA PROGRAMS, supra note 264 (“The U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) provides critical support and resources . . . to
help small businesses grow and create jobs.”).
268. See O’Brien, supra note 214 (“Every extra conduit in the process adds
to its complexity and therefore to the possibility of errors or fraud.”); Editorial
Board, Opinion, The Small Business Administration Needs Reforming, WASH.
POST (Dec. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/TB2A-X2CW (“Banks such as Wells
Fargo and JPMorgan Chase are among the largest SBA lenders. They pay a
fee for the government guarantee, but it’s worth it, in return for knowing that
Uncle Sam will pay them back if the client cannot. Sweet deal.”).
269. Congress would accomplish this by amending Section 7(a) to remove
the language that allows the SBA to make financings “in cooperation with
banks or other financial institutions,” but retain this language in Section 7(b)
so that it is would continue to apply to Disaster Loans. 15 U.S.C. §§ 636(a),
(b)(1)(A); GUIDE TO SBA PROGRAMS, supra note 264.
270. It is worth noting here that this change would require a greater level
of specialization than what currently exists at the SBA. If the SBA begins
making the majority of its loans directly, rather than through banks, it should
hire individuals with banking expertise to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
The critical difference is that the individuals would work for the SBA and
protect the government’s interests rather than working for a bank and
attempting to protect both the bank and the government’s interests.
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SBA Programs Must Comply with the Enabling Act

Another suggested change to the way the SBA and
Congress use the Small Business Act is to ensure that SBA
programs adhere to the Act itself. Congress enacted two
programs for COVID-19 business relief: the PPP under Section
7(a), small business loans,271 and the EIDL under Section 7(b),
Disaster Loans.272 Businesses are not supposed to receive money
under Section 7(a) “if the applicant can obtain credit
elsewhere.”273 Because the PPP aid distribution process was
outsourced to banks, and neither the banks nor the SBA
monitored whether the recipients used the money to protect
paychecks,274 it was not physically possible to satisfy the
provision restricting 7(a) loans to applicants who could not
“obtain credit elsewhere.”275 To comply with this requirement,
the SBA could have issued direct PPP loans exclusively to small
businesses, and outsourced the EIDL to banks to distribute to
larger businesses.
Alternatively, Section 7(b) of the Small Business Act gives
the SBA authority to create loans after a disaster.276 The global
pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus is a disaster,277 so it is
not clear why the SBA did not simply create one loan program
under its Section 7(b) Disaster Loan authority rather than
categorizing the PPP under Section 7(a) and the EIDL under
Section 7(b). If Congress and the SBA truly wanted to distribute
loans as quickly as possible, one loan program under the SBA’s
disaster loan authority would likely have been more effective for
two reasons. First, the Disaster Loan program is not restricted
to small businesses,278 so banks and the SBA would not have
needed to verify a firm’s size before dispensing money. Second,

271. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a).
272. Id. § 636(b).
273. Id. § 636(a)(1)(A)(i).
274. See Whoriskey et al., supra note 126 (finding that many businesses
did not use the money to protect employees’ paychecks).
275. Id.
276. Id. § 636(b).
277. The President has the authority to declare a disaster under the Small
Business Act. Id. § 636(a)(31)(A)(i).
278. See id. § 636(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the SBA to make disaster loans to
businesses of any size).
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the SBA could probably have administered one loan program
covering all businesses impacted by the pandemic easier than
the two separate PPP and EIDL. Had the SBA devoted all its
resources to allotting funds to impacted companies via one loan
program, it could potentially have prevented the widespread
fraud that occurred under the PPP.279
In sum, making Section 7(a) business loans directly and
continuing to make Section 7(b) Disaster Loans through banks
would ensure that small business and disaster loans are kept
separate and would serve the SBA’s twin goals of both assisting
small businesses generally and helping every business after a
declared disaster.280
B.

Short-Term Solutions

Part V.A supra discussed long-term fixes to the Small
Business Act that would move the SBA closer to Congress’s
intent for the agency to assist only small businesses.281
Sweeping change of a major regulatory regime takes a long time;
amending the Small Business Act from specific programs to a
general framework will likely be no exception. Accordingly, this
subpart suggests some short-term solutions for the SBA and
Congress to employ in the meantime. This Note recommends the
following short-term fixes: (1) that Congress appropriate
funding for states to use on fraud-fighting technology; (2) that
private parties increase filings under the Freedom of
Information Act to force the SBA to disclose loan and claims
data; and (3) that Congress amend the Inspector General Act to
increase the SBA Office of the Inspector General’s authority.
1.

Appropriate Funding to States for Use on Fraud-Fighting
Technology

Congress could appropriate federal resources to states to
use on technology upgrades to fight fraud.282 If the SBA worked
279. See Press Release, supra note 202 (stating that “potential fraudulent
activity” in COVID-19 relief programs totaled almost $100 billion).
280. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631(a), (g).
281. See id. § 631(b)(1) (“It is the declared policy of the Congress
that . . . the Small Business Administration . . . should aid and assist small
businesses . . . .”).
282. See O’Brien, supra note 214 (making this suggestion).
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more closely with states and employers, and provided states
with SBA claims data, states could help combat fraud in their
respective jurisdictions.283 The SBA could require their one
hundred and twelve district offices located all over the country
to work with states and employers in the local area.284 It could
also provide district offices with program claims data, who could
in turn provide it to local lenders. This solution is more akin to
a grassroots approach, rather than the top-down way the SBA
currently conducts itself.
2.

Greater Use of FOIA to Compel SBA to Release Loan and
Claims Data

Should the SBA decide not to cooperate with states, courts
could compel the SBA to release loan and claims data under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).285 On May 12, 2020, several
news organizations filed a complaint in the District of Columbia
to compel the SBA “to release the names, addresses, and precise
loan amounts of all individuals and entities that obtained PPP
and EIDL COVID-related loans.”286 The Court originally gave
the SBA a deadline of November 19, 2020.287 After a failed
attempt to stay the Court’s decision,288 the SBA released the
data on December 1, 2020.289 WP Co. v. U.S. Small Business
Administration is precedent supporting the release of loan data

283. Id.
284. Find Local Assistance, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., perma.cc/YM68XA9A.
285. WP Co. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 514 F. Supp. 3d 267 (D.D.C. 2021).
286. Complaint at 2, WP Co. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-1240
(D.D.C. May 12, 2020), ECF No. 1. The SBA released some of this information,
but declined to identify the exact loan figure once the dollar amount exceeded
$150,000, instead expressing the figures in ranges. WP Co. LLC v. U.S. Small
Bus. Admin., 502 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2020).
287. WP Co. LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., CV 20-1240 (JEB), 2020 WL
6887623, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2020).
288. Id. at *5.
289. See Kiernan Nicholls, SBA Releases Details on PPP Loans,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (Dec. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/ESA6L7WW (reporting on the release of loan data); Paycheck Protection Program
(PPP) Loan Data—Key Aspects, supra note 87 (noting an effective date of
December 1, 2020).

70

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2022)

under the FOIA.290 Releasing data will expose fraudulent loans
and put public pressure on the SBA and Congress to ensure
these dollars end up assisting small businesses.
3.

Appropriate Funds to Increase Timeliness of OIG
Investigations and Reports

Federal administrative agencies contain an Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), designed to combat fraud, waste, and
abuse within the programs and operations of that agency.291 The
SBA OIG is an independent and objective office created by the
Inspector General Act.292 The Act empowers the SBA OIG to
“conduct and supervise audits and investigations” into SBA
programs, “recommend corrective action[,]” and report to the
Attorney General whenever it believes “there has been a
violation of Federal criminal law.”293 While the SBA OIG has
issued reports about several of the issues covered by this Note,294
it merely has the statutory authority to recommend changes.295
Although one of the SBA OIG’s “guiding principles” is to conduct
investigations and issue reports ”defined by their [] timeliness,”

290. WP Co., 2020 WL 6887623, at *5. Although the litigation was not over
at this point because the SBA found additional PPP loan information—and
attempted to withhold some of it—the SBA released the data relevant to this
Part on December 1, 2020. See WP Co. LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., CV
20-1240, 2021 WL 5881972, at *1–*2 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2021) (summarizing the
background of these cases).
291. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (establishing the Offices of Inspector General);
id. app. 3 § 12(2) (listing the agencies that have Inspectors General).
292. 5 U.S.C. app. 3.
293. Id. app. 3 §§ 2, 4(a)(5), (b)(2)(d).
294. See supra notes 93, 242 and accompanying text.
295. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. On the first day lenders began processing PPP
applications, the SBA Inspector General published a white paper warning that
“increased loan volume, loan amounts, and expedited loan processing
timeframes may make it more difficult for SBA to identity red flags in loan
applications” and calling for the SBA to put in place “sufficient controls.” U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 20-11, WHITE PAPER:
RISK AWARENESS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM PRIOR AUDITS OF ECONOMIC
STIMULUS LOANS 1 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/DJ7H-53F7. The Project on
Government Oversight pointed out that the SBA “did not heed the watchdog’s
warnings at that time.” Nick Schwellenbach & Ryan Summers, Red Flags: The
First Year of COVID-19 Loan Fraud Cases, POGO (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://perma.cc/K6TE-QD46.
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sometimes these come too little, too late.296 For example, while
the PPP began on February 15, 2020,297 and some individuals
and firms began taking advantage of the program right away,298
the SBA OIG did not issue its first report regarding fraud in the
pandemic loan programs until July 28, 2020.299 Resource
deficiencies and low staffing at the SBA OIG have caused issues
in its investigations of other SBA programs.300
Congress could appropriate additional funding to the SBA
OIG to enable it to act faster than it currently does in detecting
fraud and abuse in SBA programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Small Business Administration was established to
assist small businesses through its contracting assistance and

296. About the Office of Inspector General, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/3KMM-U5TX; see James R. Richards & William S. Fields, The
Inspector General Act: Are Its Investigative Provisions Adequate to Meet
Current Needs?, 12 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 227, 238 (1990) (“There are many
examples of costly delays in Inspector General investigations because [] other
federal law enforcement agencies could not provide timely assistance.”).
297. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (Mar. 27, 2020) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 636) (“[T]he term ‘covered period’ means the period beginning on
February 15, 2020.”).
298. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Muge Ma, 20 Mag 5202
(S.D.N.Y. 2020), https://perma.cc/T4RD-GT99 (alleging that as early as March
2020, an individual received an $800,000 PPP loan and over $650,000 from the
EIDL based on fraudulent tax documents, bank records, and payroll records).
299. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SERIOUS
CONCERNS OF POTENTIAL FRAUD IN ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM
PERTAINING TO THE RESPONSE TO COVID-19, OIG-20-16 (July 28, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Y875-6LZM (“Our preliminary review reveals strong
indicators of widespread potential fraud in the program.”). Although the SBA
OIG issued a report on May 8, 2020 regarding the PPP, it did not mention
fraud but rather dealt with the SBA’s initial implementation of the program.
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., FLASH REPORT: SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, OIG-20-14 (May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/93XWT46T.
300. Mirit Eyal-Cohen’s Article discusses fraud and abuse within the
SBA’s Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program. Eyal-Cohen,
supra note 28. Specifically, it points out that “[t]he responsibilities of the SBA’s
investigatory staff exceeded its resources. Overload on the [SBA OIG] was a
big part of why the SBA was impaired in investigating SBICs.” Id. at 45.
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loan programs.301 Too often, however, large, sophisticated
entities profit from programs meant to help small firms.
Statutory loopholes and fraud are wasteful of federal dollars,
dearly cost the American taxpayer, and go directly against
Congressional intent for the agency.302 Although SBA programs
are not without their successes,303 the fact of their continued
fraudulent and improper utilization by large businesses calls for
a change. The process by which Congress and the SBA create
programs is fundamentally flawed: after something negative
happens in society, Congress amends the Small Business Act,
and leaves implementation of the program up to the SBA.304
When Congress passes small business assistance
legislation too quickly, there are common and foreseeable
problems across SBA programs.305 The resulting programs are
short-sighted, riddled with loopholes, impact different races
differently, and are left open to fraud.306 Congress could amend
the Small Business Act to create a broad, enabling
superstructure under which the SBA could make its own rules
to address these problems.307 Only then will SBA programs fully
favor the small businesses the agency was created to protect.

301. See Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631a (declaring congressional
policy behind the SBA).
302. See id. § 631(b)(1) (“It is the declared policy of the Congress
that . . . the Small Business Administration . . . should aid and assist small
businesses . . . .”).
303. See supra Part III.E.
304. See 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(6) (stating that the SBA Administrator may
make “rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the authority
vested in him by or pursuant to” the Small Business Act).
305. See supra Part IV.
306. See supra Part IV.
307. See supra Part V.A.

